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Summary
Thomas Molnar, a Hungarian Catholic 
emigé, was a well known fugure in the 
American conservative movement. In 
spite of the warm welcome of his works 
criticizing leftism, he stayed at the margin 
of this movement. Molnar never accepted 
the fusionism, he was critical concerning 
free market, and he openly refused many 
presuppositions of the Anglo-Saxon lib-
eral democracy. He transported elements 
of the French Catholic conservative 
thinking into the US like the attraction 
to monarchical authority and hierarchy. 
For him the idea of time-tested tradition 
was hardly important, when he used the 
notion of tradition he referd to its per-
ennialist meaning. The paper argues that 
his criticism of (political) modernity was 
form by the Pascendi dominici gregis.
Keywords: Thomas Molnar, Catholicism, 
conservative, egalitarianism, authority 
In the period of transformation of Hun-
gary during the early 90s, the term “con-
servative” had rather bad connotations. 
On the one hand, it meant hard-line com-
munists who insisted on the party state, 
and on the other hand, it meant old or 
strange people behind the times, having 
outdated and anachronistic ideas. His-
tory and the final success were thought to 
be obviously on the side of progressives, 
who, by means of their extraordinary tal-
ents and moral insight, could understand 
the necessity of historical changes and 
progress.
The use of this attribute in a positive 
sense was started by a few people around 
the governing Centre-Right party in 
1991–1992, but in those days no politician 
or media self-identified as conservative in 
Hungary. The monopoly of triumphant 
liberalism – as even the post-communist 
party used liberal rhetoric – was slowly 
broken, and in this process Thomas Mol-
nar had an important role.
Up to now, those who contradict liber-
al hegemony have been labelled by them 
as radicals or populists, if not worse, but 
never as conservatives, because this at-
tribute was gradually assigned an increas-
ingly positive connotation in Hungary 
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during the two decades after 1990. This 
brand was so much transvalued that there 
has emerged a debate around its owner-
ship. As many decades before in the US, 
in Hungary the positive rebranding of 
the term conservative was followed by the 
emergence of the term pseudo-conserva-
tive used by leftist and liberals to devalu-
ate their opponents. 
Thomas Molnar, an American emigré, 
had a non-negligible role in the revalu-
ation of the term ‘conservative’ in Hun-
gary. After 1990 he returned to Hunga-
ry from the US, and then every year he 
spent several months in Hungary. 
Although he was an American citi-
zen and a respected member of the con-
servative circles there, he did not belong 
to the mainstream in the US. He always 
stayed away from fusionism, he was always 
European, too much European.
The history of the American con-
servatives – against from the story told by 
progressives – is not the fight between of 
the elite defending its privileges and the 
people, and the contemporary Hungar-
ian situation was similar. Here, just like 
in the US, the conservatives were not 
established at all – in the US there has 
been a liberal hegemony, while in Hun-
gary a communist dictatorship and after 
1989 a liberal hegemony, too –, moreo-
ver in both places the conservatives chal-
lenged the established and hegemonic 
progressive elite. Maybe, the belligerent 
or critical tone of conservatives in both 
countries is originated from this situa-
tion. Because in the 20th century the 
progressive established themselves and 
they have became the political, econom-
ic, media and cultural elite, they formed 
a new rhetoric against conservatives. Not 
their alleged selfish defence of privileges 
and interests has been the main accusa-
tion against conservatives, but the trium-
phant progressives have emphasized that 
only they recognized the progress. That 
is why they had been successful, and the 
conservatives had been hopelessly be-
hind the time. According to the progres-
sivist self-image, because of their special 
knowledge of the iron laws of historical 
progress, only they could recognize the 
dictates of progress and adapt themselves 
to them, therefore the conservatives 
have been necessarily losers. Conserva-
tives failed the moral and epistemologi-
cal challenge of modernity. It has been a 
clearly social-Darwinist argument: adapt 
or perish. And, in case of conservatives, 
they did not feel any moral imperative 
to help the less successful people and ex-
press compassion towards marginalized 
groups of conservatives people.
The definition of conservative think-
ing has been the subject of debate. 
Conservative politics, and mainly its An-
glo-Saxon version, seems to be fairly suc-
cessful, a real alternative to progressives. 
What is more, progressivism seems to be 
out of fashion today.
An important issue within the debate 
on the definition of conservatives refers 
to its ideological or non-ideological char-
acter (Huntington, 1957). Conservatives 
typically refuse the label of ideology. 
The other important issue of this defini-
tion debate is connected loosely to the 
first one. This second debate is between 
those who define conservative thinking 
in terms of time (speed and time-test-
edness) and the problem of change (its 
modesty or slowness) and those who de-
fine conservative thinking by substantive 
elements. Obviously, the last one is closer 
to the rationalism or the creation of an 
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ideology (Wilson, 1941; Holmes, 1993). 
One can find all of these interpretations 
among American conservatives, but the 
mainstream formed during the 1950s was 
fairly ideological and emphasized sub-
stantive elements, principles or beliefs 
(Kirk, 1993; 2018). 
To indicate Thomas Molnar’s place in 
the conservative topography, it is enough 
to mention only three main elements of 
American Conservative thinking:
1. The defence of a free market econ-
omy against the New Deal economy and 
the interventionism of a welfare state 
(Lloyd and Davenport, 2013). The re-
action against the welfare state formed 
libertarian thinking in which Southern 
anti-federalist tradition merged with the 
teachings of the Austrian School (Hayek, 
Mises) (Miles, 1980; Tate, 2005). They 
criticized the welfare state in the name 
of freedom – mainly in the name of eco-
nomic freedom, and economic effectivity 
and growth. Against the Democrats, em-
phasizing social equality and welfarism, 
the Republican Party has become the par-
ty of free market and economic growth.
This pro-market argument has been 
based on rationalist anthropology saying 
that every individual rationally calculates 
his costs and benefits apart from any 
communal ties or cultural bias. On a free 
market, containing these kinds of individ-
uals, spontaneously there will emerge an 
order and a flourishing economy.
The conservatives picked the idea of 
free market partly because it seemed to 
relieve the state and solve the government 
problems of the 1970s: they hoped that 
the frustration emerging from unequal 
distribution of goods probably would not 
turn against the state and political order 
if it resulted from the blind operation of 
a market, and not from the redistribu-
tive policy of state. And they also hoped 
that the flourishing economy, produced 
by the free market, would temper social 
frustration. 
2. As it is well known, the other branch 
of the American conservative thinking is 
from Russell Kirk’s, Burkean traditional-
ism. This way of thinking argued against 
rationalism and egalitarianism and in-
stead on behalf of the authority, tradition 
and values of the Anglo-Catholic think-
ing. They have stood up against moderns 
and progressives – liberals or leftists – and 
have started the Kulturkampf. This social 
or moral conservative argument has stat-
ed that modernity has been unsustain-
able and barbaric. Their critical stance 
towards a welfare stance joined with the 
free market criticism of welfarism.
This moral or social conservative ar-
gument, rooted in the European tradi-
tion and emerging during the 1950s in 
the US, was so strange in the American 
context that even the Republican candi-
date, Barry Goldwater, named their ideas 
“so bizarre, so archaic, so self-confound-
ing, so remote from the basic American 
consensus” (quoted Brinkley, 1994, p. 
411). Because of the existing liberal con-
sent, the conservatives were called neo 
or radical Right, or pseudo-conservative, 
implying that the real conservative would 
defend the liberal consensus and estab-
lishment (Higham, 1959).
The first generation conservatives 
were taken as strange, mad (‘kooks’, 
‘crackpots’), without any chance for ef-
fective political action (Hofstadter, 1948). 
As Trilling put famously: “conservative 
impulse and the reactionary impulse do 
not, with some isolated and some eccle-
siastical exceptions, express themselves 
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in ideas but only in action or in irritable 
mental gestures which seek to resemble 
ideas” (Trilling, 1950, p. ix). 
But the public mind in the US turned 
Right after 1968 – which was a kind of 
1789 or 1793 year for many Americans 
(Brennan, 1995). After then, Meyer’s 
(Meyer, 1960) fusionism has become the 
mainstream among the American Con-
servatives (Meyer, 1962; Nisbet, 1980; 
Goldwater, 2010; Smant, 2002; Hart, 
2005; Lee, 2014; Allitt, 2009; Dunn and 
Woodard, 1996; Preece, 1980; Schoen-
wald, 2001). 
3. In the original version of fusionism, 
the third element was not present. It is the 
grandeur. This element was connected to 
anti-communism for many years, a bond 
of several conservative branches (Haddi-
gan, 2010). However, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union this bond disappeared, 
and the emphasis on national interests 
gained importance (Dorrien, 2004; Ka-
gan, 2002). 
Fusionism could survive the incoher-
ence of Kirkian traditionalism, social 
conservatism and libertarianism and free-
marketism, but fusionism was broken by 
the unusual democracy export of the Re-
publicans, which generated the conflict 
between paleo- and neo-conservatives.
Though it was not called fusionism 
then, this package appeared in Hunga-
ry after 1990. In the period of the first 
free, Antall government of 1990–1993, 
the centre Right followed a free market 
policy combined with the emphasis on 
national sovereignty and the defence of 
traditional culture and religions. And 
this Hungarian combination of free-
marketers, social or moral conservatives 
and nationalists worked at least for one 
and a half decades. (The first Orban-gov-
ernment between 1998–2002 followed 
this combination, more or less.) But in 
this country this combination was not as 
sound as in the US. Partly, because eve-
ryone – even the post-socialists – was us-
ing the free market rhetoric and policy, 
so it was not a real political marker for 
the Right. Also, because the free market 
rhetoric was used for unscrupulous pri-
vatization and the creation of the crony 
capitalism of post-socialist technocracy. 
And under the flag of a free market the 
foreigners could gain an unusual influ-
ence on economic life after the collapse 
of the socialist economy. Beside the mor-
al criticism following the corruptions of 
privatization and the market economy, it 
was crucial that the elite that were man-
aging the free market couldn’t build an 
effective and prosperous Hungary. As it 
is well known, beside the freedom argu-
ment, the most important argument for 
the free market was its effectiveness vis-à-
vis a planned economy. Hungary, under 
the leadership of the post-socialist elite, 
using free market rhetoric, descended 
into high unemployment, indebtedness 
and economic crisis. Thus, because of 
practical and political reasons, the Right 
broke with the local version of fusionism, 
and the ideas of the free market have got 
out from the thinking of Right of Hun-
gary. 
In Hungary conservative thinking di-
vorced from free marketism in the first 
decades of the 21st century. Here the 
traditional suspicion concerning the free 
market has become rather widespread: 
conservatives suspect that the market re-
lations transform or destroy the family, 
nation, traditions and religion, as it was 
described by Daniel Bell (Bell, 1976) or 
Marx.1 In spite of this suspicion and the 
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obvious incoherence of the values of free 
market and moral or social conservative 
values, still there are some thin bonds 
between conservatives and free market-
ers like anti-egalitarianism, anti-commu-
nism, meritocratism and patriotism.
Obviously, Hungarian-born Thomas 
Molnar stood out of the fusionist main-
stream. There is no reference in any of 
his works to the Austrian School or lib-
ertarians. In general, the criticism of the 
welfare state in the name of freedom 
and/or economic efficiency was distant 
from him. And, he was similarly critical 
towards the export of democracy. He was, 
probably, too European or too much of a 
Francophile. European, mainly continen-
tal, conservative thinking, differs clearly 
from the American one: the first differ-
ence is characterized by the Roman unity 
of tradition, authority (hierarchy of men) 
and religion based on the Tomist tradi-
tion. These are fused into the concept 
of a sacred monarchy like the divine im-
perators in Rome, the rex Christianissimus 
kings of France and the godly princes in 
the Protestant countries (Arendt, 1990, 
p. 117). The European conservative tra-
dition insisted on the idea of the natural 
inequality of men and on the idea of the 
incompleteness of man: because man is 
incomplete, he needs some completion 
from without, like from magistrates, cul-
ture or other institutions independent 
from an individual’s will. The conserva-
tives in the US were much closer to the 
liberal anthropology: they were ready 
to except the ideas of equality and indi-
vidualism as well as the consent of the 
governed as the only acceptable basis of 
political order.
Vis-á-vis the Anglo-Saxon conserva-
tives, tradition interpreted in terms of 
time – speed of change like modesty 
and durability – was not interesting for 
continental conservatives. Continental 
conservatives interpreted tradition as 
something perennial, originating from 
the nature of man, and at the same time 
they were more critical by condemning 
the political, cultural or other forms of 
modernity than the Anglo-Saxons were. 
This rather solid anti-modernism was 
logically connected to the perennialist 
understanding of tradition. As in the case 
of Thomas Molnar, one can hardly find 
any concession to modernity among con-
tinental conservatives. Thomas Molnar’s 
work can be understood mainly in terms 
encyclics of Syllabus Errorum (1864) and 
Pascendi dominici gregis (1907).
Thomas Molnar referred to de Mais-
tre, Donoso Cortes, Voegelin and Carl 
Schmitt, but his thinking stood closest to 
Bernanos and the French circle of Charles 
Maurras (Molnar, 2011; 1995b) The idea 
of tradition as something time-tested and 
that survived the trial-and-error experi-
ments, so important for Anglo-Saxons, 
was much less important for Molnar 
than the idea of authority and the idea 
of perennial tradition. The backbone of 
his thinking was God and authority, and 
their relation. In general, the authority 
became a marker for anti-modernist con-
servatives, probably because the modern-
ist was not able to domesticate this idea, 
while the Anglo-Saxon notion of tradi-
tion was absorbed by many modernists.
According to Molnar, modernity is a 
hopeless, lost cause by origin because it is 
the fruit of the rebel: modernity is a shift 
from the transcendental interpretation 
of the world towards an immanent one. 
This rebel hopes that the world is self-suf-
ficient, it can be made perfect, therefore 
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it doesn’t need God, nor Revelation, nor 
its teacher, the Church. Molnar, like his 
continental exemplars, always criticized 
the liberalismus triumphans as responsible 
for modernity.
The modernists’ rebel means for him 
that modernists refuse the notion of in-
complete man and that he needs some 
completion from without. Some kind of 
forum externum. Accordingly, politics is 
not a separate sphere or a second order 
activity, but the most intensive appear-
ance of the problem of basic human re-
lations, as Carl Schmitt wrote in his The 
Concept of Political (Schmitt, 1996). There-
fore, the sharpest consequence of human 
nature is authority. Politics is not a sphere 
beside many others, but it is itself the 
problem of human relations, and their 
institutional solutions is the established 
authority. This thinking on the parallel of 
politics and theology haphazardly follows 
St Augustine’s description of civitas Dei: 
without grace the sinful man loves him-
self, therefore he rebels and seeks power, 
so he desperately needs an authority, a 
forum externum to make human life pos-
sible. The (sinful) nature of man re-
quires his subordination to some scheme 
or principle of order not, in its essence, 
made by himself.
Hobbes’ question, according to Carl 
Schmitt (Schmitt, 2008) – Quis iudicabit? 
Quis interpretabitur? – refers to the episte-
mological side of the human condition: 
instead of methodology, a political deci-
sion may decide the epistemological am-
biguities, such as what is reality or what 
is the meaning and what is the motiva-
tion of a certain action? Because of the 
imperfection and inscrutability of conditio 
humana (motives, consequences are ob-
scure and contingent), there is need for 
compulsion to make order from plurality 
and ambiguity. Therefore, the monarchy 
is the core structure of the world.
In Molnar’s implicit political theology, 
human life is founded on metaphysical 
presuppositions and not on conventions 
or experiences. By means of these ideas 
he questioned the liberal or modernist 
contractarian thinking characterizing 
the Americans who founded the state on 
individual autonomy and the consent of 
people. Obviously, in the thinking based 
on the idea of original sin, there is no 
practical place for the will of people. 
The modernists – that is, the heretics 
according to Pascendi dominici gregis – 
would solve Leo Strauss’ problem2 by 
bracketing it. According to Molnar, this 
is the source of tensions in modernity. 
The modernists would eliminate theol-
ogy and politics by utopism, because they 
seek to liquidate enforcement and obe-
dience by their metaphysical turn, called 
humanism (Molnar, 1978). Molnar’s in-
terpretations of politics and theology are 
critical towards modernity because mo-
dernity basically refuses the incomplete-
ness of man and its concomitant results, 
the need for hierarchical relations and 
institutions. Meanwhile, mainstream con-
servatives in the US have accepted mo-
dernity and egalitarianism. 
 The core idea of Thomas Molnar’s 
works is that man, on the one hand, is zoon 
politikon and, on the other hand, open for 
transcendence, as well, and the tension 
between these two spheres is characteris-
tic of the human condition. That is why 
man is anxious (Molnar, 1978) and looks 
for certainty, which is the source of his 
utopical propensity, that is, his search for 
this-worldly salvation from his anxieties. 
This utopism dominates modernity as 
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the “synthesis of all heresies” (Pope Pius 
X, 1907). Not the double nature of man, 
but rebellion against his nature was seen 
by Molnar as the source of problems in 
modernity. In this sense, modernity is not 
modern at all, it is only a new version of 
human rebellion; what is new in moder-
nity is the triumph of heresy: “Were one 
to attempt the task of collecting together 
all the errors that have been broached 
against the faith and to concentrate the 
sap and substance of them all into one, 
he could not better succeed than the 
Modernists have done. Nay, they have 
done more than this, for, as we have al-
ready intimated, their system means the 
destruction not of the Catholic religion 
alone but of all religion. With good rea-
son do the rationalists applaud them, for 
the most sincere and the frankest among 
the rationalists warmly welcome the 
modernists as their most valuable allies” 
(Pope Pius X, 1907).
 The meaning of the modernists’ re-
bel is the hope that man can get on his 
own, that is, he is able to become, god 
and self-completed (Molnar, 1987).
Original sin – in this thinking – neces-
sitates political and ecclesiastical authority. 
The status naturalis is the status civilis. Any 
anti-political or utopical hope is against 
(sinful) human nature that needs author-
ity – that is – some control from without. 
The social life needs the limitation of hu-
man passions, ambitions and wishes and 
not their liberation. Man is not rationally, 
nor morally autonomous. Thomas Molnar 
quoted Bonhoeffer to criticize the mod-
ernists’ optimism that evil was declining in 
the world and man’s power to make good 
had increased (Molnar, 1978). 
With this thinking the ordo rerum hu-
manorum ant the corpus politicum mysticum 
are always coincided. Man needs a hierar-
chy where authority limits his judgements 
and restrains his will. That is, order comes 
from inequality and enforcement. To get 
rid of them and live a decent human life 
at the same time is impossible – which was 
called “utopia” by Molnar. Only angels 
and animals can live peacefully without 
some inequalities, whereas human being 
needs authority (Molnar, 1995a). 
The conservatives on the Continent 
have only moderately trusted in educa-
tion or any methods on the modification 
of consciousness, called enlightening or 
consciousness raising, because the hu-
man order, first of all, is not a problem 
of knowledge as modernists since the En-
lightenment have supposed. Modernity is 
full of epistemological debates about how 
to get the proper knowledge and what 
the proper knowledge is, but Molnar was 
pre-modern in this context. He couldn’t 
see the moral and political problems in 
terms of epistemology, because these are 
anthropological and metaphysical ones.
For him the problem of the author-
ity of state and church was eminently 
the problem of modernity. Both of these 
institutions are necessarily authoritative, 
and both are equally important to save 
order.
Neither conservatives nor Thomas 
Molnar wanted an uncontrolled or un-
limited state, because politicians are fal-
lible, too. But the control of the state by 
citizens – or any kind of contractarianism 
– wouldn’t solve the problem, according 
to Molnar. Molnar, just as non-American 
conservatives generally, regularly criti-
cized contractarian thinking and the new-
left ideal of civil society, because in this 
thinking everyone joins to a contract by 
his own judgement to fulfil his wants and 
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interests. Contractual relations are cre-
ated to be instruments to get something. 
Therefore, it is easy to step in or out from 
them. The problem for Molnar was that 
an instrumental relation would never 
have compelling authority. As de Maistre 
said, man doesn’t respect what was creat-
ed by him and can be easily changed. Du-
ties and loyalties connected to contrac-
tarian relations can be easily denounced. 
Therefore authority, in the proper sense, 
limiting and disciplining people for the 
sake of order, cannot emerge from a 
contract. What is more, any contractual 
arguments contain an anarchistic notion 
of freedom as something originated from 
the pre-social or pre-political condition. 
Therefore anyone may step out from 
these relationships. Any state founded on 
the notion of a contract will be in a state 
of permanent rebellion and resistance, 
because everyone wants to change the 
contract as a useless instrument. Mod-
ern people tend to modify their relations 
instead of restraining themselves. Con-
tinental conservative logic is simple: au-
thority cannot depend on those people’s 
permanent consent who should be disci-
plined by this authority. With any relation 
founded on personal consent, it is easy to 
quit the relation in case of any unwanted 
discipline or limitation.
If the state would be controlled di-
rectly by citizens, it would end the disci-
plining functioning of a state, which is 
necessary because of human nature. So, 
the control of a state is understood dif-
ferently by continental conservatives: on 
the one hand, they suppose a transcen-
dental world and its institutional embodi-
ment, the Catholic Church and the pope 
(see Joseph de Maistre), as a reality exist-
ing above the state (Lovejoy, 2001; Mol-
nar, 1988; Maistre, 1994). While liberals 
would limit the state by unlimited person-
al interests and wishes, Thomas Molnar 
would limit the state as well as its citizens. 
The presupposition of a reality above 
politics means also that there is some-
thing more important than politics, and 
a lot of issues cannot be solved by politics. 
Politics are not able to provide salvation 
in this world. The transcendental or sa-
cred world – mediated by church, priests 
and rites – is the source of authority, and 
only this authority can integrate with the 
human world by disciplining people and 
by evoking obedience and loyalty from 
them. These effects of authority are con-
nected to the same effects of morality 
which limits authority and is defended by 
authority.
Thomas Molnar found the sociologi-
cal description of the sacred in Weber’s 
notion of charisma – which in his last pa-
per, Politics as Vocation (Weber, 2004) was 
not only on ideal type of legitimate order, 
but tacitly characterized any politician – 
and is what put the mysticum back into 
its place (Molnar, 1988).3 The notion of 
the sacred assimilated charisma and the 
Burkean notion of the sublime, but Mol-
nar took this notion mainly from Rudolf 
Otto’s notion of mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans. For Molnar, power is sacred: 
it frightens and excites at the same time 
(Molnar, 1988). 
The two institutions of power are the 
church and state – like in case of Weber. 
Without the sacred and these – by defini-
tion authoritative – institutions, the exist-
ence of a human order is questionable, 
which is necessarily a religious communi-
ty (universitas fidelium) in the Gallican tra-
dition. At this point Thomas Molnar was 
rather selective: he referred positively to 
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Fustel de Coulanges, while refusing those 
French modernists who belonged to the 
same tradition like Rousseau, Comte and 
Durkheim. He explained the decline of 
the state and church by the ascent of 
“molecules”, that is, the individual’s con-
science had become the source of the sa-
cred (Molnar, 1988). Molnar argued that 
the essence of modernity/heresy/utopi-
anism was the idea of the self-sufficient 
man (ens completum).
Thomas Molnar was especially inter-
ested in the Catholic Church, and beside 
modernists he criticized modern Catho-
lics, too, following Pius X: “the partisans 
of error are to be sought not only among 
the Church’s open enemies; they lie hid, 
a thing to be deeply deplored and feared, 
in her very bosom and heart, and are the 
more mischievous, the less conspicuously 
they appear. We allude, Venerable Breth-
ren, to many who belong to the Catholic 
laity, nay, and this is far more lamentable, 
to the ranks of the priesthood itself, who, 
feigning a love for the Church, lacking 
the firm protection of philosophy and 
theology, nay more, thoroughly imbued 
with the poisonous doctrines taught by 
the enemies of the Church, and lost to 
all sense of modesty, vaunt themselves as 
reformers of the Church; and, forming 
more boldly into line of attack, assail all 
that is most sacred in the work of Christ, 
not sparing even the person of the Divine 
Redeemer, whom, with sacrilegious dar-
ing, they reduce to a simple, mere man” 
(Pope Pius X, 1907).
Practically, this is the core idea of his 
Christian Humanism: A Critique of the Secu-
lar City and Its Ideology (Molnar, 1978): 
The Catholic Church is threatened by the 
danger of becoming in its visible form a 
different church.
The crisis of modernity originates, 
according to Molnar, in the takeover of 
society. Instead of the sacred, (civil) so-
ciety would control political and ecclesi-
astical power. Metaphysically, modernity 
is a new version of human rebellion, and 
sociologically, modernity is the rebel of 
(civil) society. Therefore, modern prob-
lems are coming from this rebellion. In 
this respect, he continued the criticism 
of revolutions and capitalism in the 19th 
century and the criticism of mass society 
in the 20th century.
The two institutions of authority are 
connected to the sacred, but (civil) soci-
ety is not, therefore the last one cannot 
be the source of order, it cannot invoke 
tremendum and admiratio. For him, (civ-
il) society is connected to plurality and 
self-interest, but pluralism gives birth to 
relativism and self-interests produce im-
manentism – i.e. there exist only this-
worldly and individual realities (Molnar, 
1988) – which characterizes modernity in 
the Pascendi dominici gregis. Society is not 
able to create order because of its con-
tractual and permanently bargaining na-
ture. (This social criticism of society was 
connected in his case to the moral criti-
cism of hedonism and eudaimonism.) 
In modernity what are called state and 
church are not state and church in the 
proper sense, because they are curtailed 
from authority and sanctity. Modernity is 
the world of society.
There were and there will always be 
some frustrations in this-worldy life, there 
is no return to the trouble-free Paradise 
from the condition humana, even if man 
aspires to it. Those who think politics, 
authority and inequality are permanently 
necessary for a decent life usually accept 
this troublesome characteristic of human 
460
Academic Workshop and Book Reviews
life, as well. And they, like Thomas Mol-
nar, instead of hoping for a trouble-free 
world, accept that frustrations and con-
flicts are perennial, and authority has to 
exist because it is the only chance for a 
decent, less-than-perfect life. 
„In like manner, the other pains and 
hardships of life will have no end or ces-
sation on earth; for the consequences 
of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and 
they must accompany man so long as life 
lasts. To suffer and to endure, therefore, 
is the lot of humanity; let them strive as 
they may, no strength and no artifice will 
ever succeed in banishing from human 
life the ills and troubles which beset 
it. If any there are who pretend differ-
ently – who hold out to a hard-pressed 
people the boon of freedom from pain 
and trouble, an undisturbed repose, 
and constant enjoyment – they delude 
the people and impose upon them, and 
their lying promises will only one day 
bring forth evils worse than the present. 
Nothing is more useful than to look 
upon the world as it really is, and at the 
same time to seek elsewhere, as We have 
said, for the solace to its troubles” (Pope 
Pius X, 1907). 
But in modern politics, ambitious 
leaders can get support from the mobili-
zation of people by promising frustration- 
and a conflict-free world. In modernist 
thinking, governing is crisis management 
founded on proper knowledge – the new-
est and newest waves of modernists think 
that existence, constructed by the previ-
ous versions of modernism, is unbearable 
– and are not capable of making decisions. 
In their mind being governed means be-
ing lead to utopia, and may go together 
with hard frustrations and troubles which 
should be taken to get to utopia. The 
progressives want to emerge with a much 
better world, while the conservatives are 
satisfied by running a decent or liveable 
one. What is desirable is not necessarily 
possible, and the action following logical 
arguments does not necessarily result in 
the desired results. For the modernist the 
future is not ambiguous, but it is simply 
the question of real knowledge (science, 
expertise) and benevolent decision.
As it can be seen, Thomas Molnar 
separated from the American main-
stream not only by his aversion to the 
free market and libertarianism, but more 
fundamentally, by his open refusal to 
many elements of American conservative 
thinking coming from a liberal heritage. 
From these antithetical ideas the most 
important ones are equality, authority, 
hierarchy and the sacred. He imported 
Continental – dominantly French Catho-
lic – conservative ideas into the US, but 
these stayed isolated in the conservative 
coterie.
Notes
1  „All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train 
of ancient and venerable prejudices and opin-
ions, are swept away, all new-formed ones be-
come antiquated before they can ossify. All that 
is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.” 
(Marx and Engels, 1969)
2  The fundamental political and moral problem 
according to Strauss is: „whether men can ac-
quire knowledge of the good without which 
they cannot guide their lives individually or col-
lectively by the unaided effort of their natural 
powers, or whether they are dependent for that 
knowledge on Divine Revelation. No alternative 
is more fundamental than this: human guid-
ance or divine guidance”. (Strauss, 1953, p. 74) 
See Meier, 2006.
3  However, he was rather ambivalent concerning 
the concept of charismatic domination. See 
Molnar 1995a.
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